| Publication type: | Article in scientific journal |
| Type of review: | Peer review (publication) |
| Title: | Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity |
| Authors: | Schneider, Stephan A. Kunze, Sven |
| et. al: | No |
| DOI: | 10.1162/rest_a_01319 |
| Published in: | The Review of Economics and Statistics |
| Page(s): | 1 |
| Pages to: | 33 |
| Issue Date: | 15-Mar-2023 |
| Publisher / Ed. Institution: | MIT Press |
| ISSN: | 0034-6535 1530-9142 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Disaster relief; Distributive politics; Hurricane; Natural disaster; Nonlinearity; Party alignment; Political favoritism; Political economy |
| Subject (DDC): | 320: Politics 363: Environmental and security problems |
| Abstract: | Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965-2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are unbiased when disasters are either very strong or weak. Only after medium-intensity hurricanes do areas governed by presidents' co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This hump-shaped political bias explains 8.3 percent of overall relief spending, totaling about USD 400 million per year. |
| URI: | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/30357 |
| Fulltext version: | Published version |
| License (according to publishing contract): | Licence according to publishing contract |
| Departement: | Life Sciences and Facility Management |
| Organisational Unit: | Institute of Natural Resource Sciences (IUNR) |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen Life Sciences und Facility Management |
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Schneider, S. A., & Kunze, S. (2023). Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319
Schneider, S.A. and Kunze, S. (2023) ‘Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 1–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
S. A. Schneider and S. Kunze, “Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 1–33, Mar. 2023, doi: 10.1162/rest_a_01319.
SCHNEIDER, Stephan A. und Sven KUNZE, 2023. Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 15 März 2023. S. 1–33. DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01319
Schneider, Stephan A., and Sven Kunze. 2023. “Disastrous Discretion : Political Bias in Relief Allocation Varies Substantially with Disaster Severity.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, March, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
Schneider, Stephan A., and Sven Kunze. “Disastrous Discretion : Political Bias in Relief Allocation Varies Substantially with Disaster Severity.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Mar. 2023, pp. 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
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