Publikationstyp: | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift |
Art der Begutachtung: | Peer review (Publikation) |
Titel: | Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity |
Autor/-in: | Schneider, Stephan A. Kunze, Sven |
et. al: | No |
DOI: | 10.1162/rest_a_01319 |
Erschienen in: | The Review of Economics and Statistics |
Seite(n): | 1 |
Seiten bis: | 33 |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 15-Mär-2023 |
Verlag / Hrsg. Institution: | MIT Press |
ISSN: | 0034-6535 1530-9142 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Schlagwörter: | Disaster relief; Distributive politics; Hurricane; Natural disaster; Nonlinearity; Party alignment; Political favoritism; Political economy |
Fachgebiet (DDC): | 320: Politik 363: Umwelt- und Sicherheitsprobleme |
Zusammenfassung: | Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965-2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are unbiased when disasters are either very strong or weak. Only after medium-intensity hurricanes do areas governed by presidents' co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This hump-shaped political bias explains 8.3 percent of overall relief spending, totaling about USD 400 million per year. |
URI: | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/30357 |
Volltext Version: | Publizierte Version |
Lizenz (gemäss Verlagsvertrag): | Lizenz gemäss Verlagsvertrag |
Departement: | Life Sciences und Facility Management |
Organisationseinheit: | Institut für Umwelt und Natürliche Ressourcen (IUNR) |
Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | Publikationen Life Sciences und Facility Management |
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Schneider, S. A., & Kunze, S. (2023). Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319
Schneider, S.A. and Kunze, S. (2023) ‘Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 1–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
S. A. Schneider and S. Kunze, “Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 1–33, Mar. 2023, doi: 10.1162/rest_a_01319.
SCHNEIDER, Stephan A. und Sven KUNZE, 2023. Disastrous discretion : political bias in relief allocation varies substantially with disaster severity. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 15 März 2023. S. 1–33. DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01319
Schneider, Stephan A., and Sven Kunze. 2023. “Disastrous Discretion : Political Bias in Relief Allocation Varies Substantially with Disaster Severity.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, March, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
Schneider, Stephan A., and Sven Kunze. “Disastrous Discretion : Political Bias in Relief Allocation Varies Substantially with Disaster Severity.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Mar. 2023, pp. 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01319.
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