Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence
Authors: Damianov, Damian S.
Oechssler, Jörg
Becker, Johannes Gerd
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior
Volume(Issue): 68
Issue: 1
Pages: 60
Pages to: 76
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Elsevier
ISSN: 0899-8256
Language: English
Subjects: Auction; Uniform; Experiment; Discriminatory
Subject (DDC): 
Abstract: In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller’s cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format.
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Institute for Risk & Insurance (IRI)
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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