| Publication type: | Article in scientific journal |
| Type of review: | Peer review (publication) |
| Title: | Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence |
| Authors: | Damianov, Damian S. Oechssler, Jörg Becker, Johannes Gerd |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008 |
| Published in: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume(Issue): | 68 |
| Issue: | 1 |
| Page(s): | 60 |
| Pages to: | 76 |
| Issue Date: | 2010 |
| Publisher / Ed. Institution: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Auction; Uniform; Experiment; Discriminatory |
| Subject (DDC): | 380: Transportation |
| Abstract: | In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller’s cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format. |
| URI: | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16387 |
| Fulltext version: | Published version |
| License (according to publishing contract): | Licence according to publishing contract |
| Departement: | School of Management and Law |
| Organisational Unit: | Institute for Risk & Insurance (IRI) |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Show full item record
Damianov, D. S., Oechssler, J., & Becker, J. G. (2010). Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, D.S., Oechssler, J. and Becker, J.G. (2010) ‘Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence’, Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), pp. 60–76. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
D. S. Damianov, J. Oechssler, and J. G. Becker, “Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 60–76, 2010, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
DAMIANOV, Damian S., Jörg OECHSSLER und Johannes Gerd BECKER, 2010. Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010. Bd. 68, Nr. 1, S. 60–76. DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, Damian S., Jörg Oechssler, and Johannes Gerd Becker. 2010. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1): 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
Damianov, Damian S., et al. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, 2010, pp. 60–76, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.