| Publikationstyp: | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift |
| Art der Begutachtung: | Peer review (Publikation) |
| Titel: | Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence |
| Autor/-in: | Damianov, Damian S. Oechssler, Jörg Becker, Johannes Gerd |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008 |
| Erschienen in: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Band(Heft): | 68 |
| Heft: | 1 |
| Seite(n): | 60 |
| Seiten bis: | 76 |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 2010 |
| Verlag / Hrsg. Institution: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Schlagwörter: | Auction; Uniform; Experiment; Discriminatory |
| Fachgebiet (DDC): | 380: Verkehr |
| Zusammenfassung: | In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller’s cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format. |
| URI: | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16387 |
| Volltext Version: | Publizierte Version |
| Lizenz (gemäss Verlagsvertrag): | Lizenz gemäss Verlagsvertrag |
| Departement: | School of Management and Law |
| Organisationseinheit: | Institut für Risk & Insurance (IRI) |
| Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | Publikationen School of Management and Law |
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Damianov, D. S., Oechssler, J., & Becker, J. G. (2010). Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, D.S., Oechssler, J. and Becker, J.G. (2010) ‘Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence’, Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), pp. 60–76. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
D. S. Damianov, J. Oechssler, and J. G. Becker, “Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 60–76, 2010, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
DAMIANOV, Damian S., Jörg OECHSSLER und Johannes Gerd BECKER, 2010. Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010. Bd. 68, Nr. 1, S. 60–76. DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, Damian S., Jörg Oechssler, and Johannes Gerd Becker. 2010. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1): 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
Damianov, Damian S., et al. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, 2010, pp. 60–76, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
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