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  2. School of Management and Law
  3. Publikationen
  4. Publikationen School of Management and Law
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dc.contributor.authorDamianov, Damian S.-
dc.contributor.authorOechssler, Jörg-
dc.contributor.authorBecker, Johannes Gerd-
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-28T15:19:44Z-
dc.date.available2019-03-28T15:19:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1090-2473de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16387-
dc.description.abstractIn the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller’s cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behaviorde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectAuctionde_CH
dc.subjectUniformde_CH
dc.subjectExperimentde_CH
dc.subjectDiscriminatoryde_CH
dc.subject.ddc380: Verkehrde_CH
dc.titleUniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidencede_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitInstitut für Risk & Insurance (IRI)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end76de_CH
zhaw.pages.start60de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume68de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
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Damianov, D. S., Oechssler, J., & Becker, J. G. (2010). Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, D.S., Oechssler, J. and Becker, J.G. (2010) ‘Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence’, Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), pp. 60–76. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
D. S. Damianov, J. Oechssler, and J. G. Becker, “Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 60–76, 2010, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
DAMIANOV, Damian S., Jörg OECHSSLER und Johannes Gerd BECKER, 2010. Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply : experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010. Bd. 68, Nr. 1, S. 60–76. DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008
Damianov, Damian S., Jörg Oechssler, and Johannes Gerd Becker. 2010. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1): 60–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.
Damianov, Damian S., et al. “Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply : Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, 2010, pp. 60–76, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008.


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