|Title:||Does personalized information improve health plan choices when individuals are distracted?|
|Authors :||Kaufmann, Cornel|
|Published in :||Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Elsevier|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Type of review:||Peer review (Publication)|
|Subjects :||Health insurance; Decision under uncertainty; Limited attention|
|Subject (DDC) :||360: Social problems and social insurance|
|Abstract:||Choice-based health insurance systems allow individuals to select a health plan that fits their needs. However, bounded rationality and limited attention may lead to sub-optimal insurance coverage and higher-than-expected out-of-pocket payments. In this paper, we study the impact of providing personalized information on health plan choices in a laboratory experiment. We seek to more closely mimic real-life choices by randomly providing an incentivized distraction to some individuals. We find that providing personalized information significantly improves health plan choices. The positive effect is even larger and longer-lasting if individuals are distracted from their original task. In addition to providing decision support, receiving personalized information restores the awareness of the choice setting to a level comparable to the case without distraction thus reducing inertia. Our results indicate that increasing transparency of the health insurance system and providing tailored information can help individuals to make better choices and reduce their out-of-pocket expenditures.|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Publication type:||Article in scientific Journal|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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