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Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Strategic self-regulation in groups : collective implementation intentions help cooperate when cooperation is called for
Authors: Thürmer, J. Lukas
Wieber, Frank
Gollwitzer, Peter M.
et. al: No
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.561388
Published in: Frontiers in Psychology
Volume(Issue): 11
Issue: 561388
Issue Date: 24-Nov-2020
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Frontiers Research Foundation
ISSN: 1664-1078
Language: English
Subjects: Collective implementation intentions; Cooperation; Motivation science; Prisoners’ dilemma; Self-regulation; Small group performance
Subject (DDC): 302: Social interaction
Abstract: Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can use We-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners' dilemma game when playing against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners' dilemma game did not increase cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas.
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): CC BY 4.0: Attribution 4.0 International
Departement: School of Health Sciences
Organisational Unit: Institute of Public Health (IPH)
Appears in collections:Publikationen Gesundheit

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