Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Top-down versus bottom-up : comparing strategies of municipal mergers in Western European countries
Authors: Kaiser, Claire
DOI: 10.3224/dms.v8i1.19113
Published in: Der moderne Staat
Volume(Issue): 2015
Issue: 1
Pages: 113
Pages to: 127
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Barbara Budrich
ISSN: 1865-7192
Language: English
Subjects: Amalgamation; Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis; Strategy; Municipal merger
Subject (DDC): 658.1: Organization and finance
Abstract: Some countries have reduced the number of local units in a drastic way (e.g., Germany, United Kingdom, Denmark). In other countries, there have been no major territorial reforms (e.g. Switzerland, France). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the following main research question: What are the factors that influence a country’s merger activities? To answer this question, an analytical framework considering the institutional context, territorial structure, incentives for mergers, and so-called policy windows has been developed. 16 Western European countries have been selected for the analysis. Using Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), this paper shows what configurations of factors are associated with a high merger activity: a) an open policy window when municipalities are small, b) an open policy window in municipalities with a low degree of local autonomy, or c) incentives given by higher-ranking state levels for amalgamations in small municipalities with a low degree of local autonomy.
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Institute of Public Management (IVM)
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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