|Publication type:||Article in scientific journal|
|Type of review:||Peer review (publication)|
|Title:||Transitions in the negotiations on climate change : from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond|
Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.
|Published in:||International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution:||Springer|
|Subjects:||Adaption; Climate ahange; First-mover advantage; Prisoner's dilemma game|
|Subject (DDC):||363: Environmental and security problems|
|Abstract:||Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.|
|Fulltext version:||Published version|
|License (according to publishing contract):||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Economic Policy (FWP)|
|Appears in collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.