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dc.contributor.authorHöchle, Daniel-
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, Markus-
dc.contributor.authorWalter, Ingo-
dc.contributor.authorYermack, David-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T08:12:10Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T08:12:10Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.issn0304-405Xde_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9087-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification discount persists even with these controls for endogeneity. However, in selection models the discount disappears entirely when we introduce governance variables in the second stage, and in dynamic panel GMM models the discount narrows by 37% when we include governance variables.de_CH
dc.language.isodede_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Economicsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectOrganizational structurede_CH
dc.subjectDiversificationde_CH
dc.subjectFirm valuationde_CH
dc.subjectCorporate governancede_CH
dc.subject.ddc658.1: Organisation und Finanzende_CH
dc.titleHow much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?de_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end60de_CH
zhaw.pages.start41de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume103de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
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Höchle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, I., & Yermack, D. (2012). How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1), 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025
Höchle, D. et al. (2012) ‘How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1), pp. 41–60. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
D. Höchle, M. Schmid, I. Walter, and D. Yermack, “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 41–60, 2012, doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
HÖCHLE, Daniel, Markus SCHMID, Ingo WALTER und David YERMACK, 2012. How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics. 2012. Bd. 103, Nr. 1, S. 41–60. DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025
Höchle, Daniel, Markus Schmid, Ingo Walter, and David Yermack. 2012. “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?” Journal of Financial Economics 103 (1): 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
Höchle, Daniel, et al. “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 103, no. 1, 2012, pp. 41–60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.


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