| Publikationstyp: | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift |
| Art der Begutachtung: | Peer review (Publikation) |
| Titel: | How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? |
| Autor/-in: | Höchle, Daniel Schmid, Markus Walter, Ingo Yermack, David |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025 |
| Erschienen in: | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Band(Heft): | 103 |
| Heft: | 1 |
| Seite(n): | 41 |
| Seiten bis: | 60 |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 2012 |
| Verlag / Hrsg. Institution: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0304-405X |
| Sprache: | Deutsch |
| Schlagwörter: | Organizational structure; Diversification; Firm valuation; Corporate governance |
| Fachgebiet (DDC): | 658.1: Organisation und Finanzen |
| Zusammenfassung: | We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification discount persists even with these controls for endogeneity. However, in selection models the discount disappears entirely when we introduce governance variables in the second stage, and in dynamic panel GMM models the discount narrows by 37% when we include governance variables. |
| URI: | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9087 |
| Volltext Version: | Publizierte Version |
| Lizenz (gemäss Verlagsvertrag): | Lizenz gemäss Verlagsvertrag |
| Departement: | School of Management and Law |
| Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | Publikationen School of Management and Law |
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Höchle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, I., & Yermack, D. (2012). How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1), 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025
Höchle, D. et al. (2012) ‘How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1), pp. 41–60. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
D. Höchle, M. Schmid, I. Walter, and D. Yermack, “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 41–60, 2012, doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
HÖCHLE, Daniel, Markus SCHMID, Ingo WALTER und David YERMACK, 2012. How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics. 2012. Bd. 103, Nr. 1, S. 41–60. DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025
Höchle, Daniel, Markus Schmid, Ingo Walter, and David Yermack. 2012. “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?” Journal of Financial Economics 103 (1): 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
Höchle, Daniel, et al. “How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 103, no. 1, 2012, pp. 41–60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025.
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