|Title:||Constitutional compliance : a game-theoretic analysis|
|Authors :||Lehne, Jens|
|Advisors / Reviewers :||Vallender, Klaus A.|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Stämpfli|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution:||Bern|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Subject (DDC) :||342: Constitutional and administrative law (CH)|
|Abstract:||One of the primary functions of constitutional law is to bind the state, to prevent the abuse of power by the state. However, why should state agents comply with constitutional constraints, particularly if such compliance runs contrary to their self-interests? Trusting that state agents will always be guided by a moral duty to observe the law seems too naive a position. On the other hand, the ultimate means of ensuring compliance by force - police and military - are in the hands of the state, i.e. the very institution that is supposed to be checked by constitutional law. How, then, is constitutional compliance possible? This question is answered within a game-theoretic framework. Throughout, the focus is placed less on the technical side of game theory, but more on its underlying social logic, its plausibility and its practical implications. Moreover, insights from legal theory, especially on constitutional interpretation, are integrated into the analysis.|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Public Commercial Law (ZOW)|
|Publication type:||Doctoral Thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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