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dc.contributor.authorAmmann, Manuel-
dc.contributor.authorHöchle, Daniel-
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, Markus-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T07:00:14Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T07:00:14Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.issn0306-686Xde_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9065-
dc.description.abstractRecent research questions the existence of a conglomerate discount. This study addresses two of the most important explanations for the conglomerate discount and finds evidence in support of an economically and statistically significant discount. The first explanation is that the risk‐reducing effect of diversification increases debt value and consequently the use of the book value of debt leads to an underestimation of firm value in diversified firms. We show that the effect of using an imputed market value of debt reduces the conglomerate discount only by a small fraction. However, consistent with the value‐transfer hypothesis, we find the discount to increase in leverage and no discount for all‐equity firms. An agency cost‐based explanation, which reconciles these conflicting findings, is that managers in levered firms become aligned with creditors and reduce firm risk at the expense of shareholders. Hence, the diversification discount only occurs in levered firms and stems from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders over corporate risk taking. Second, the conglomerate discount may emerge from a neglect of the endogenous nature of the diversification decision. We first show that the conglomerate discount in fact disappears when we account for endogeneity in a Heckman selection model. However, when we account for fixed effects, the conglomerate discount remains statistically and economically significant, also in a Heckman selection‐model or instrumental variables framework.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherWileyde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Business Finance and Accountingde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectOrganizational structurede_CH
dc.subjectDiversificationde_CH
dc.subjectMarket value of debtde_CH
dc.subjectEndogeneityde_CH
dc.subjectFixed effectsde_CH
dc.subject.ddc657: Rechnungswesende_CH
dc.titleIs there really no conglomerate discount?de_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.xde_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1-2de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end288de_CH
zhaw.pages.start264de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume39de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Ammann, M., Höchle, D., & Schmid, M. (2012). Is there really no conglomerate discount? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 39(1-2), 264–288. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x
Ammann, M., Höchle, D. and Schmid, M. (2012) ‘Is there really no conglomerate discount?’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 39(1-2), pp. 264–288. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x.
M. Ammann, D. Höchle, and M. Schmid, “Is there really no conglomerate discount?,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 39, no. 1-2, pp. 264–288, 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x.
AMMANN, Manuel, Daniel HÖCHLE und Markus SCHMID, 2012. Is there really no conglomerate discount? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 2012. Bd. 39, Nr. 1-2, S. 264–288. DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x
Ammann, Manuel, Daniel Höchle, and Markus Schmid. 2012. “Is There Really No Conglomerate Discount?” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 39 (1-2): 264–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x.
Ammann, Manuel, et al. “Is There Really No Conglomerate Discount?” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 39, no. 1-2, 2012, pp. 264–88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02261.x.


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