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  2. School of Management and Law
  3. Publikationen
  4. Publikationen School of Management and Law
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dc.contributor.authorDamianov, Damian S.-
dc.contributor.authorBecker, Johannes Gerd-
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-25T12:16:28Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-25T12:16:28Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/8488-
dc.description.abstractWe examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volumede_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Economic Reviewde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc658.8: Marketingmanagementde_CH
dc.titleAuctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatoryde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue4de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end593de_CH
zhaw.pages.start571de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume2008de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Damianov, D. S., & Becker, J. G. (2009). Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory. European Economic Review, 2008(4), 571–593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002
Damianov, D.S. and Becker, J.G. (2009) ‘Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory’, European Economic Review, 2008(4), pp. 571–593. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
D. S. Damianov and J. G. Becker, “Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory,” European Economic Review, vol. 2008, no. 4, pp. 571–593, 2009, doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
DAMIANOV, Damian S. und Johannes Gerd BECKER, 2009. Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory. European Economic Review. 2009. Bd. 2008, Nr. 4, S. 571–593. DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002
Damianov, Damian S., and Johannes Gerd Becker. 2009. “Auctions with Variable Supply : Uniform Price versus Discriminatory.” European Economic Review 2008 (4): 571–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.
Damianov, Damian S., and Johannes Gerd Becker. “Auctions with Variable Supply : Uniform Price versus Discriminatory.” European Economic Review, vol. 2008, no. 4, 2009, pp. 571–93, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002.


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