1. ZHAW digitalcollection
  2. School of Management and Law
  3. Publikationen
  4. Publikationen School of Management and Law
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-29181
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEbert, Nico-
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Thierry-
dc.contributor.authorAmbühl, Benjamin-
dc.contributor.authorSchöni, Lorin-
dc.contributor.authorZimmermann, Verena-
dc.contributor.authorKnieps, Melanie-
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-24T13:46:58Z-
dc.date.available2023-11-24T13:46:58Z-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.identifier.issn0167-4048de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1872-6208de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/29181-
dc.description.abstractIn the aftermath of cybersecurity incidents within organizations, explanations of their causes often revolve around isolated technical or human events such as an Advanced Persistent Threat or a “bad click by an employee.” These explanations serve to identify the responsible parties and inform efforts to improve security measures. However, safety science researchers have long been aware that explaining incidents in socio-technical systems and determining the role of humans and technology in incidents is not an objective procedure but rather an act of social constructivism: what you look for is what you find, and what you find is what you fix. For example, the search for a technical “root cause” of an incident might likely result in a technical fix, while from a sociological perspective, cultural issues might be blamed for the same incident and subsequently lead to the improvement of the security culture. Starting from the insights of safety science, this paper aims to extract lessons on what general explanations for cybersecurity incidents can be identified and what methods can be used to study causes of cybersecurity incidents in organizations. We provide a framework that allows researchers and practitioners to proactively select models and methods for the investigation of cybersecurity incidents.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofComputers & Securityde_CH
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de_CH
dc.subjectCybersecurityde_CH
dc.subjectHuman errorde_CH
dc.subjectIncidentde_CH
dc.subjectSafety sciencede_CH
dc.subject.ddc363: Umwelt- und Sicherheitsproblemede_CH
dc.titleLearning from safety science : a way forward for studying cybersecurity incidents in organizationsde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitInstitut für Wirtschaftsinformatik (IWI)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.21256/zhaw-29181-
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue103435de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume134de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
zhaw.author.additionalNode_CH
zhaw.display.portraitYesde_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
2023_Ebert-etal_Learning-from-safety-science.pdf2.59 MBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show simple item record
Ebert, N., Schaltegger, T., Ambühl, B., Schöni, L., Zimmermann, V., & Knieps, M. (2023). Learning from safety science : a way forward for studying cybersecurity incidents in organizations. Computers & Security, 134(103435). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435
Ebert, N. et al. (2023) ‘Learning from safety science : a way forward for studying cybersecurity incidents in organizations’, Computers & Security, 134(103435). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435.
N. Ebert, T. Schaltegger, B. Ambühl, L. Schöni, V. Zimmermann, and M. Knieps, “Learning from safety science : a way forward for studying cybersecurity incidents in organizations,” Computers & Security, vol. 134, no. 103435, 2023, doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435.
EBERT, Nico, Thierry SCHALTEGGER, Benjamin AMBÜHL, Lorin SCHÖNI, Verena ZIMMERMANN und Melanie KNIEPS, 2023. Learning from safety science : a way forward for studying cybersecurity incidents in organizations. Computers & Security. 2023. Bd. 134, Nr. 103435. DOI 10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435
Ebert, Nico, Thierry Schaltegger, Benjamin Ambühl, Lorin Schöni, Verena Zimmermann, and Melanie Knieps. 2023. “Learning from Safety Science : A Way Forward for Studying Cybersecurity Incidents in Organizations.” Computers & Security 134 (103435). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435.
Ebert, Nico, et al. “Learning from Safety Science : A Way Forward for Studying Cybersecurity Incidents in Organizations.” Computers & Security, vol. 134, no. 103435, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103435.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.