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dc.contributor.authorGünster, Andrea-
dc.contributor.authorCarree, Martin-
dc.contributor.authorvan Dijk, Mathijs-
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T12:35:37Z-
dc.date.available2019-09-26T12:35:37Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/18279-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how the formation and termination of cartels affect the performance and efficiency of their member firms. We identify 142 publicly listed firms active in 49 European cartels between 1983 and 2004. We construct empirical measures for the performance of the cartel firms to investigate three types of economic inefficiency: allocative inefficiency (assessed by profitability), productive or x-inefficiency (labor productivity), and dynamic inefficiency (innovation, measured by R&D investments). We find that profitability is higher and productivity and R&D investments are lower during the cartel period. All three types of inefficiency worsen over the cartel period and are especially pronounced for the ringleader. In sum, cartels are associated with deteriorating allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc338: Produktionde_CH
dc.titleDo cartels undermine economic efficiencyde_CH
dc.typeKonferenz: Sonstigesde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitFachstelle für Wirtschaftspolitik (FWP)de_CH
zhaw.conference.details36th EARIE Annual Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 3-5 September 2009de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawNode_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewNot specifiedde_CH
zhaw.author.additionalNode_CH
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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