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dc.contributor.authorAbrell, Jan-
dc.contributor.authorRausch, Sebastian-
dc.contributor.authorSchwarz, Giacomo A.-
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-05T14:19:45Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-05T14:19:45Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.issn0095-0696de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16536-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework. We characterize the drivers for non-uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences. Quantitatively assessing the case of price-based CO2 emissions control in the U.S. economy, we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax. The deviation from uniform emissions pricing, however, becomes non-negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy-induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy. Our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target, downstream vs. upstream taxation, pre-existing distortionary taxes, and parametric uncertainty in firms’ and households’ equilibrium tax responses.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Environmental Economics and Managementde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectDifferentiated environmental taxde_CH
dc.subjectCarbon pricingde_CH
dc.subjectClimate policyde_CH
dc.subjectHeterogeneous householdde_CH
dc.subject.ddc363: Umwelt- und Sicherheitsproblemede_CH
dc.titleHow robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns?de_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Energie und Umwelt (CEE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue92de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end814de_CH
zhaw.pages.start783de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume2018de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Abrell, J., Rausch, S., & Schwarz, G. A. (2017). How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2018(92), 783–814. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008
Abrell, J., Rausch, S. and Schwarz, G.A. (2017) ‘How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns?’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2018(92), pp. 783–814. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008.
J. Abrell, S. Rausch, and G. A. Schwarz, “How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns?,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 2018, no. 92, pp. 783–814, 2017, doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008.
ABRELL, Jan, Sebastian RAUSCH und Giacomo A. SCHWARZ, 2017. How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2017. Bd. 2018, Nr. 92, S. 783–814. DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008
Abrell, Jan, Sebastian Rausch, and Giacomo A. Schwarz. 2017. “How Robust Is the Uniform Emissions Pricing Rule to Social Equity Concerns?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2018 (92): 783–814. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008.
Abrell, Jan, et al. “How Robust Is the Uniform Emissions Pricing Rule to Social Equity Concerns?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 2018, no. 92, 2017, pp. 783–814, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.09.008.


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