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dc.contributor.authorAbrell, Jan-
dc.contributor.authorRausch, Sebastian-
dc.contributor.authorYonezawa, Hidemichi-
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-05T14:17:02Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-05T14:17:02Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.issn0347-0520de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1467-9442de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16535-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we examine the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system (ETS) when some emissions are regulated outside the ETS. We theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare. Using a numerical simulation model of the European Union (EU), we find that moderate minimum prices in the EU ETS can reduce the costs of EU climate policy by up to 30 percent. We also find that, because of tax-interaction effects, the optimal minimum price in the EU ETS should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non-ETS sectors.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherWileyde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofThe Scandinavian Journal of Economicsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectEmissions tradingde_CH
dc.subjectGeneral equilibriumde_CH
dc.subjectPartitioned regulationde_CH
dc.subject.ddc363: Umwelt- und Sicherheitsproblemede_CH
dc.titleHigher price, lower costs? : minimum prices in the EU emissions trading schemede_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Energie und Umwelt (CEE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12279de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue2de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end481de_CH
zhaw.pages.start446de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume121de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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