1. ZHAW digitalcollection
  2. School of Management and Law
  3. Publikationen
  4. Publikationen School of Management and Law
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHefti, Andreas-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Shuo-
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-26T13:17:58Z-
dc.date.available2019-03-26T13:17:58Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.issn1664-7041de_CH
dc.identifier.issn664-705Xde_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/16340-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the decisions of competing firms which consumers to target with their messages. Limited attention changes the conventional strategic role of targeted information, as information-senders may profitably intrude a competitor’s segment of prime consumers. Therefore, the presence of inattentive consumers can incentivize firms to behave as mass-advertisers, even if firms had the ability to direct their messages at infinite precision towards consumers with the most aligned preferences. Anticipating that the equilibrium information provision will not reflect their preferences, consumers with high nuisance costs optimally decide to block information. This adverse effect of information dissemination can explain the recently observed increased use of ad blocking tools by consumers, which has become a key issue to the entire advertising industry. Within the targeting framework, we further analyze the consequences of limited attention for the determinants of market shares, information taxation, attention competition between firms, the value of marketing data to firms, consumer privacy concerns and firm pricing strategies.de_CH
dc.format.extent42de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherUniversität Zürichde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series / Department of Economicsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectAdvertisingde_CH
dc.subjectBounded rationalityde_CH
dc.subjectAd avoidancede_CH
dc.subjectDifferentiationde_CH
dc.subjectInformation taxde_CH
dc.subjectLimited attentionde_CH
dc.subjectOligopolistic competitionde_CH
dc.subjectPrivacy concernsde_CH
dc.subjectSalience competitionde_CH
dc.subjectTargeted advertisingde_CH
dc.subjectTargetingde_CH
dc.subject.ddc659: Werbung und Öffentlichkeitsarbeitde_CH
dc.titleTargeted information and limited attentionde_CH
dc.typeWorking Paper – Gutachten – Studiede_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Arbeitsmärkte, Digitalisierung und Regionalökonomie (CLDR)de_CH
zhaw.publisher.placeZürichde_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.5167/uzh-124916de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.series.number230de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Show simple item record
Hefti, A., & Liu, S. (2016). Targeted information and limited attention. Universität Zürich. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-124916
Hefti, A. and Liu, S. (2016) Targeted information and limited attention. Zürich: Universität Zürich. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-124916.
A. Hefti and S. Liu, “Targeted information and limited attention,” Universität Zürich, Zürich, 2016. doi: 10.5167/uzh-124916.
HEFTI, Andreas und Shuo LIU, 2016. Targeted information and limited attention. Zürich: Universität Zürich
Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. 2016. “Targeted Information and Limited Attention.” Zürich: Universität Zürich. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-124916.
Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. Targeted Information and Limited Attention. Universität Zürich, 2016, https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-124916.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.