Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Becker, Johannes Gerd | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Gersbach, Hans | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Grimm, Oliver | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-13T15:09:14Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-12-13T15:09:14Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/13823 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public-good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public-good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers in the event of negative macroeconomic shocks. | de_CH |
| dc.language.iso | en | de_CH |
| dc.rights | Licence according to publishing contract | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Econ Workshop | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Rule | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Majority | de_CH |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330: Wirtschaft | de_CH |
| dc.title | Debt-sensitive majority rules | de_CH |
| dc.type | Konferenz: Sonstiges | de_CH |
| dcterms.type | Text | de_CH |
| zhaw.departement | School of Management and Law | de_CH |
| zhaw.organisationalunit | Institut für Risk & Insurance (IRI) | de_CH |
| zhaw.conference.details | MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010 | de_CH |
| zhaw.funding.eu | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.originated.zhaw | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.status | publishedVersion | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.review | Keine Begutachtung | de_CH |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law | |
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Becker, J. G., Gersbach, H., & Grimm, O. (2010). Debt-sensitive majority rules. MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010.
Becker, J.G., Gersbach, H. and Grimm, O. (2010) ‘Debt-sensitive majority rules’, in MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010.
J. G. Becker, H. Gersbach, and O. Grimm, “Debt-sensitive majority rules,” in MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010, 2010.
BECKER, Johannes Gerd, Hans GERSBACH und Oliver GRIMM, 2010. Debt-sensitive majority rules. In: MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010. Conference presentation. 2010
Becker, Johannes Gerd, Hans Gersbach, and Oliver Grimm. 2010. “Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules.” Conference presentation. In MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010.
Becker, Johannes Gerd, et al. “Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules.” MPI Econ Workshop, Bonn, Germany, 30 June 2010, 2010.
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