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dc.contributor.authorEgli, Dominik-
dc.contributor.authorOngena, Steven-
dc.contributor.authorSmith, David C.-
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-09T10:05:47Z-
dc.date.available2018-11-09T10:05:47Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.issn1544-6123de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/12699-
dc.description.abstractWe study the decision an entrepreneur faces in financing multiple projects and show that relationship financing will arise endogenously in an environment where strategic defaults are likely, even when firms have access to arm's-length financing. Relationship financing allows an entrepreneur to build a private reputation for repayment that reduces the cost of financing. However, in an environment where the risk of strategic default is low, the benefits from reputation building are outweighed by holdup rents extractable by the incumbent lender. Entrepreneurs then choose to finance projects from single or multiple, arm's-length lenders. We relate these findings to studies that positively associate accounting standards, creditor rights, and legal enforcement with economic growth.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofFinance Research Lettersde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectRelationship financingde_CH
dc.subjectContract enforcementde_CH
dc.subjectJudicial efficiencyde_CH
dc.subjectReputation buildingde_CH
dc.subjectStaged financingde_CH
dc.subject.ddc658.1: Organisation und Finanzende_CH
dc.titleOn the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship financede_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue1de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawNode_CH
zhaw.pages.end39de_CH
zhaw.pages.start23de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume3de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Egli, D., Ongena, S., & Smith, D. C. (2006). On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance. Finance Research Letters, 3(1), 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005
Egli, D., Ongena, S. and Smith, D.C. (2006) ‘On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance’, Finance Research Letters, 3(1), pp. 23–39. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005.
D. Egli, S. Ongena, and D. C. Smith, “On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance,” Finance Research Letters, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 23–39, 2006, doi: 10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005.
EGLI, Dominik, Steven ONGENA und David C. SMITH, 2006. On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance. Finance Research Letters. 2006. Bd. 3, Nr. 1, S. 23–39. DOI 10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005
Egli, Dominik, Steven Ongena, and David C. Smith. 2006. “On the Sequencing of Projects, Reputation Building, and Relationship Finance.” Finance Research Letters 3 (1): 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005.
Egli, Dominik, et al. “On the Sequencing of Projects, Reputation Building, and Relationship Finance.” Finance Research Letters, vol. 3, no. 1, 2006, pp. 23–39, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2005.08.005.


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