Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHefti, Andreas-
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-10T12:57:05Z-
dc.date.available2018-09-10T12:57:05Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/10361-
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the strategies. The approach is particularly helpful in applications because (i) it allows the complexity of the uniqueness problem to be reduced to a two-player game, (ii) boundary conditions are less critical compared to standard procedures, and (iii) best replies need not be everywhere differentiable. The usefulness of the separation approach is illustrated with several examples, including an application to asymmetric games and to a two-dimensional price-information game.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherEconometric Societyde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical Economicsde_CH
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/de_CH
dc.subjectOligopopyde_CH
dc.subjectSymmetric equilibriumde_CH
dc.subjectSymmetric gamede_CH
dc.subjectUniquenessde_CH
dc.subject.ddc330: Wirtschaftde_CH
dc.subject.ddc510: Mathematikde_CH
dc.titleEquilibria in symmetric games : theory and applicationsde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Arbeitsmärkte, Digitalisierung und Regionalökonomie (CLDR)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.21256/zhaw-3979-
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE2151de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue3de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end1002de_CH
zhaw.pages.start979de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume12de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Equilibria in symmetric games Theory and applications_2017_SC1.1.pdf318.64 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show simple item record
Hefti, A. (2017). Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications. Theoretical Economics, 12(3), 979–1002. https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979
Hefti, A. (2017) ‘Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications’, Theoretical Economics, 12(3), pp. 979–1002. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979.
A. Hefti, “Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications,” Theoretical Economics, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 979–1002, 2017, doi: 10.21256/zhaw-3979.
HEFTI, Andreas, 2017. Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications. Theoretical Economics. 2017. Bd. 12, Nr. 3, S. 979–1002. DOI 10.21256/zhaw-3979
Hefti, Andreas. 2017. “Equilibria in Symmetric Games : Theory and Applications.” Theoretical Economics 12 (3): 979–1002. https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979.
Hefti, Andreas. “Equilibria in Symmetric Games : Theory and Applications.” Theoretical Economics, vol. 12, no. 3, 2017, pp. 979–1002, https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-3979.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.