Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Egli, Dominik | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-30T10:43:27Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-08-30T10:43:27Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 1997 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0965-7576 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1467-9396 | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/10033 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The theory of optimal debt relief hinges critically on the assumption that the output of a defaulting debtor country can be partially confiscated by the creditors. This assumption is at odds with the crucial feature of international credit relationships. The present paper focuses on an alternative enforcement method, namely the impediment of international trade. It is shown that a similar result can be derived. Additionally, it can be rational to grant further credit to countries with very little initial endowment, even though it is clear to the creditors that they will grant debt relief afterwards. | de_CH |
| dc.language.iso | en | de_CH |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | de_CH |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Review of International Economics | de_CH |
| dc.rights | Licence according to publishing contract | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Schuldenerlass | de_CH |
| dc.subject | Theorie | de_CH |
| dc.subject.ddc | 338: Produktion | de_CH |
| dc.title | Optimal debt relief under threat of trade punishments | de_CH |
| dc.type | Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift | de_CH |
| dcterms.type | Text | de_CH |
| zhaw.departement | School of Management and Law | de_CH |
| zhaw.organisationalunit | Institut für Verwaltungs-Management (IVM) | de_CH |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1467-9396.00056 | de_CH |
| zhaw.funding.eu | No | de_CH |
| zhaw.issue | 2 | de_CH |
| zhaw.originated.zhaw | Yes | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.end | 283 | de_CH |
| zhaw.pages.start | 272 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.status | publishedVersion | de_CH |
| zhaw.volume | 5 | de_CH |
| zhaw.publication.review | Peer review (Publikation) | de_CH |
| Appears in collections: | Publikationen School of Management and Law | |
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Egli, D. (1997). Optimal debt relief under threat of trade punishments. Review of International Economics, 5(2), 272–283. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00056
Egli, D. (1997) ‘Optimal debt relief under threat of trade punishments’, Review of International Economics, 5(2), pp. 272–283. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00056.
D. Egli, “Optimal debt relief under threat of trade punishments,” Review of International Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 272–283, 1997, doi: 10.1111/1467-9396.00056.
EGLI, Dominik, 1997. Optimal debt relief under threat of trade punishments. Review of International Economics. 1997. Bd. 5, Nr. 2, S. 272–283. DOI 10.1111/1467-9396.00056
Egli, Dominik. 1997. “Optimal Debt Relief under Threat of Trade Punishments.” Review of International Economics 5 (2): 272–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00056.
Egli, Dominik. “Optimal Debt Relief under Threat of Trade Punishments.” Review of International Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 1997, pp. 272–83, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00056.
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