|Title:||Do institutions promote rationality? : an experimental study of the three-door anomaly|
|Authors :||Slembeck, Tilman|
|Published in :||Journal of economic behavior & organization|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Elsevier|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Type of review:||Peer review (Publication)|
|Subjects :||Communication; Competition; Institution; Learning; Three door anomaly; Group decision making; Individual decision making|
|Subject (DDC) :||150: Psychology |
|Abstract:||The three-door problem is an example of a systematic violation of a key rationality postulate that has attracted much attention. In this seemingly simple individual decision task, most people initially fail to apply correctly Bayes’ Law, and to make the payoff-maximizing choice. Previous experimental studies have shown that individual learning reduces the incidence of irrational choices somewhat, but is far from eliminating it. We experimentally study the roles of communication and competition as institutions to mitigate the choice anomaly. We show that the three-door anomaly can be entirely eliminated by these institutions.|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Economic Policy (FWP)|
|Publication type:||Article in scientific Journal|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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