Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHefti, Andreas-
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-17T08:03:20Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-17T08:03:20Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/9080-
dc.description.abstractThis article explores the relationship between uniqueness and stability in differentiable regular games, with a major focus on the important classes of sum-aggregative, two-player and symmetric games. We consider three types of popular dynamics, continuous-time gradient dynamics as well as continuous- and discrete-time best-reply dynamics, and include aggregate-taking behavior as a non-strategic behavioral variant. We show that while in general games stability conditions are only sufficient for uniqueness, they are likely to be necessary as well in models with sum-aggregative or symmetric payoff functions. In particular, a unique equilibrium always verifies the stability conditions of all dynamics if strategies are equilibrium complements, and this also holds for both continuous-time dynamics if strategies are equilibrium substitutes with bounded slopes. These findings extend to the case of aggregate-taking equilibria. We further analyze the stability relations between the various dynamics, and demonstrate that the restrictive nature of the discrete dynamics originates from simultaneity of adjustments. Asynchronous decisions or heterogeneous forward thinking may stabilize the adjustment process.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciencesde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc510: Mathematikde_CH
dc.titleOn the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable gamesde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitZentrum für Energie und Umwelt (CEE)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.008de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.pages.end96de_CH
zhaw.pages.start83de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume80de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.