|Title:||Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory|
|Authors :||Damianov, Damian S.|
Becker, Johannes Gerd
|Published in :||European Economic Review|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Elsevier|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Type of review:||Peer review (Publication)|
|Subject (DDC) :||658.8: Marketing management|
|Abstract:||We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Publication type:||Article in scientific Journal|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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