Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Auctions with variable supply : uniform price versus discriminatory
Authors: Damianov, Damian S.
Becker, Johannes Gerd
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.002
Published in: European Economic Review
Volume(Issue): 2008
Issue: 4
Pages: 571
Pages to: 593
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Elsevier
ISSN: 0014-2921
Language: English
Subject (DDC): 658.8: Marketing management
Abstract: We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume
URI: https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/8488
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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