Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study
Authors: Betz, Regina
Greiner, Ben
Schweitzer, Sascha
Seifert, Stefan
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12403
Published in: The Economic Journal
Volume(Issue): 127
Issue: 605
Pages: 351
Pages to: 371
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher / Ed. Institution: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 1468-0297
Language: English
Subjects: Emissions trading; Auction; Experiment
Subject (DDC): 380: Communications and transportation
Abstract: We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.
Fulltext version: Published version
License (according to publishing contract): Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Center for Energy and Environment (CEE)
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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