|Publication type:||Article in scientific journal|
|Type of review:||Peer review (publication)|
|Title:||Auction format and auction sequence in multi-item multi-unit auctions : an experimental study|
|Published in:||The Economic Journal|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution:||Oxford University Press|
|Subjects:||Emissions trading; Auction; Experiment|
|Subject (DDC):||380: Communications and transportation|
|Abstract:||We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.|
|Fulltext version:||Published version|
|License (according to publishing contract):||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Energy and Environment (CEE)|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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