Targeted information and limited attention

Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12319

Publication type:	Article in scientific journal
Type of review:	Peer review (publication)
Title:	Targeted information and limited attention
Authors:	Hefti, Andreas Liu, Shuo
et. al:	No
DOI:	10.1111/1756-2171.12319
Published in:	The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume(Issue):	51
Issue:	2
Page(s):	402
Pages to:	420
Issue Date:	2020
Publisher / Ed. Institution:	Wiley
ISSN:	0741-6261 1756-2171
Language:	English
Subject (DDC):	659: Advertising and public relations
Abstract:	We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.
URI:	https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/124916/ https://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/21871
Fulltext version:	Published version
License (according to publishing contract):	Licence according to publishing contract
Departement:	School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit:	Center for Labor, Digital and Regional Economics (CLDR)
Appears in collections:	Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Hefti, A., & Liu, S. (2020). Targeted information and limited attention. The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), 402–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319

Hefti, A. and Liu, S. (2020) ‘Targeted information and limited attention’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 51(2), pp. 402–420. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.

A. Hefti and S. Liu, “Targeted information and limited attention,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 402–420, 2020, doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12319.

HEFTI, Andreas und Shuo LIU, 2020. Targeted information and limited attention. The RAND Journal of Economics [online]. 2020. Bd. 51, Nr. 2, S. 402–420. DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12319. Verfügbar unter: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/124916/

Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. 2020. “Targeted Information and Limited Attention.” The RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2): 402–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.

Hefti, Andreas, and Shuo Liu. “Targeted Information and Limited Attention.” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 2, 2020, pp. 402–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12319.