Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.21256/zhaw-18635
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dc.contributor.authorNeuhaus, Stephan-
dc.contributor.authorSchweizer, Remo-
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-07T14:30:08Z-
dc.date.available2019-11-07T14:30:08Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-5386-7289-1de_CH
dc.identifier.issn0018-9219de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/18635-
dc.description© 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.de_CH
dc.description.abstractWe propose Downright, a novel framework based on Seccomp, Berkeley Packet Filter, and PTrace, that makes it possible to equip new and existing C applications with a request broker architecture. An extensive configuration language allows AppArmor-like configuration that supports programmers in building rules for system call parameter validation and result sanitization. Access to these privileged function calls can be restricted both within Linux kernel and user spaces. Downright's main strength compared to related approaches is that it implements a complete mediation request broker architecture, in which all system calls are vetted before execution, either by the kernel or by a request broker, which runs as another process. This isolates the main program from many failures due to programming bugs and attacks, which would have to pass not only the attacked program, but the request broker also. We argue that this makes acquiring and releasing elevated privileges easier and safer. Downright eliminates the need to write Seccomp programs, instead allowing policies to be expressed declaratively through a rich policy language. We demonstrate the viability of this approach by instrumenting nginx, an industrial-strength web server and reverse proxy. While this instrumentation takes only a single line of code, we argue that even this effort can be avoided by suitable C runtime code. We show that Downright's overhead is substantial, halving nginx's perfomance, but propose measures for optimisation.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherIEEEde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the IEEEde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectSecurityde_CH
dc.subjectPrivilegesde_CH
dc.subjectLinuxde_CH
dc.subjectUnixde_CH
dc.subject.ddc005: Computerprogrammierung, Programme und Datende_CH
dc.titleDownright : a framework and toolchain for privilege handlingde_CH
dc.typeKonferenz: Paperde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Engineeringde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitInstitut für Angewandte Informationstechnologie (InIT)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/SecDev.2019.00019de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.21256/zhaw-18635-
zhaw.conference.detailsIEEE SecDev 2019, McLean, USA, 25 - 27 September 2019de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawYesde_CH
zhaw.publication.statusacceptedVersionde_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
zhaw.title.proceedingsProceedings of the 2019 IEEE Secure Development (SecDev) Conferencede_CH
zhaw.author.additionalNode_CH
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Engineering

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