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dc.contributor.authorMurphy, Ryan O.-
dc.contributor.authorAckermann, Kurt Alexander-
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-31T14:13:02Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-31T14:13:02Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.issn0022-2496de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/17812-
dc.description.abstractSome accounts of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma have focused on developing simple indexes of a game’s severity – i.e., the degree to which a game promotes non-cooperative choices –which are derived wholly from the game’s payoff structure. However, the psychological mechanisms of why a game’s payoffs affect cooperation rates are not clearly explicated with this approach. We show how simple models of decision making can predict the emergence of trust based cooperation as the expected utility maximizing strategy when individual social preferences and positive expectations (beliefs) are simultaneously taken into account.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherElsevierde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Psychologyde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subjectIndex of cooperationde_CH
dc.subjectPrisoner’s dilemmade_CH
dc.subjectRationalizabilityde_CH
dc.subjectSocial preferencede_CH
dc.subject.ddc302: Soziale Interaktionde_CH
dc.titleSocial preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperationde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitInstitut für Marketing Management (IMM)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmp.2015.06.001de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawNode_CH
zhaw.pages.end50de_CH
zhaw.pages.start45de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume67de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
zhaw.author.additionalNode_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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