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Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Explaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations : a network approach
Authors : Hegele, Yvonne
et. al : No
DOI : 10.21256/zhaw-5532
Published in : Public Administration
Volume(Issue) : 96
Issue : 4
Pages : 753
Pages to: 768
Issue Date: 20-Aug-2018
Publisher / Ed. Institution : Wiley
ISSN: 0033-3298
Language : English
Subject (DDC) : 320: Politics
Abstract: The core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision-making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources.
Further description : This is the peer reviewed version which has been published in final form at []. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Fulltext version : Accepted version
License (according to publishing contract) : Licence according to publishing contract
Restricted until : 2020-08-20
Departement: School of Management and Law
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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