|Publication type:||Article in scientific journal|
|Type of review:||Peer review (publication)|
|Title:||Higher price, lower costs? : minimum prices in the EU emissions trading scheme|
|Published in:||The Scandinavian Journal of Economics|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution:||Wiley|
|Subjects:||Emissions trading; General equilibrium; Partitioned regulation|
|Subject (DDC):||363: Environmental and security problems|
|Abstract:||In this paper, we examine the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system (ETS) when some emissions are regulated outside the ETS. We theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare. Using a numerical simulation model of the European Union (EU), we find that moderate minimum prices in the EU ETS can reduce the costs of EU climate policy by up to 30 percent. We also find that, because of tax-interaction effects, the optimal minimum price in the EU ETS should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non-ETS sectors.|
|Fulltext version:||Published version|
|License (according to publishing contract):||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Energy and Environment (CEE)|
|Appears in collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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