|Title:||Supply function competition with asymmetric costs : theory and experiment|
|Authors :||Hefti, Andreas|
|Published in :||Economics Letters|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Elsevier|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Type of review:||Peer review (Publication)|
|Subjects :||Market power; Multi-unit auction; Supply function competition|
|Subject (DDC) :||330: Economics|
|Abstract:||We study a multi-unit auction, where bidders differ in their marginal costs, and compare the outcome to the Bertrand (or single-unit auction) analogue.|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Economic Policy (FWP)|
|Publication type:||Article in scientific Journal|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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