|Publication type:||Article in scientific journal|
|Type of review:||Peer review (publication)|
|Title:||Supply function competition with asymmetric costs : theory and experiment|
|Published in:||Economics Letters|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution:||Elsevier|
|Subjects:||Market power; Multi-unit auction; Supply function competition|
|Subject (DDC):||330: Economics|
|Abstract:||We study a multi-unit auction, where bidders differ in their marginal costs, and compare the outcome to the Bertrand (or single-unit auction) analogue.|
|Fulltext version:||Published version|
|License (according to publishing contract):||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Economic Policy (FWP)|
|Appears in collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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