|Title:||Environmental tax reform : efficiency and political feasibility|
|Authors :||Felder, Stefan|
|Published in :||Ecological Economics|
|Publisher / Ed. Institution :||Elsevier|
|License (according to publishing contract) :||Licence according to publishing contract|
|Type of review:||Peer review (publication)|
|Subjects :||Computable general equilibrium model; Political feasability; Cost efficiency; Environmental tax reform|
|Subject (DDC) :||333.7: Land, recreational areas and energy|
|Abstract:||Although market-based environmental measures like uniform CO2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost, they do not prevail in real world policies. An efficiency oriented environmental policy fails, as it involves a redistribution of pollution rights, resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents. The present paper analyzes the tradeoff between efficiency and political feasibility of several CO2 tax and reimbursement schemes, using a computable general equilibrium model of Switzerland. The simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform CO2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries.|
|Departement:||School of Management and Law|
|Organisational Unit:||Center for Energy and Environment (CEE)|
|Publication type:||Article in scientific journal|
|Appears in Collections:||Publikationen School of Management and Law|
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