Publication type: Article in scientific journal
Type of review: Peer review (publication)
Title: Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics
Authors : Gersbach, Hans
Ponta, Oriana
DOI : 10.1007/s11127-016-0396-6
Published in : Public Choice
Volume(Issue) : 2017
Issue : 3-4
Pages : 289
Pages to: 321
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher / Ed. Institution : Springer
ISSN: 0048-5829
Language : English
Subject (DDC) : 320: Politics
Abstract: The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.
Fulltext version : Published version
License (according to publishing contract) : Licence according to publishing contract
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisational Unit: Institute of Public Management (IVM)
Appears in Collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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