Publikationstyp: Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift
Art der Begutachtung: Peer review (Publikation)
Titel: Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics
Autor/-in: Gersbach, Hans
Ponta, Oriana
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0396-6
Erschienen in: Public Choice
Band(Heft): 2017
Heft: 3-4
Seiten: 289
Seiten bis: 321
Erscheinungsdatum: 2017
Verlag / Hrsg. Institution: Springer
ISSN: 0048-5829
Sprache: Englisch
Fachgebiet (DDC): 320: Politik
Zusammenfassung: The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.
Volltext Version: Publizierte Version
Lizenz (gemäss Verlagsvertrag): Lizenz gemäss Verlagsvertrag
Departement: School of Management and Law
Organisationseinheit: Institut für Verwaltungs-Management (IVM)
Enthalten in den Sammlungen:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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