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dc.contributor.authorDrevs, Florian-
dc.contributor.authorTscheulin, Dieter K.-
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-05T09:17:38Z-
dc.date.available2019-09-05T09:17:38Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.issn0044-2372de_CH
dc.identifier.issn1861-8928de_CH
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalcollection.zhaw.ch/handle/11475/18080-
dc.description.abstractThis study analyses the impact of two financially equivalent frames of a co-payment policy on the choice between a co-payment policy and one with full cost recovery. It also examines the incentive effect of the co-payment and the post-choice evaluation on the pay-offs in case of unexpected losses, using the example of health insurance. Two experimental studies form the context for an empirical investigation of the theoretical considerations. We examine the framing-related effects of a rebate compared to a premium reduction frame of a co-payment policy. The results confirm that a rebate frame has a positive effect on the intention to choose a co-payment policy. The intention to avoid claims in the premium reduction frame is greater than in the rebate frame. In case of unexpected losses because of high insurance claims, the rebate frame results in less dissatisfaction and causes fewer regret effects. The results support the theoretical considerations that insurance companies should account for these differences and design their co-payment policies according their priorities, either with a rebate or a premium reduction frame.de_CH
dc.language.isoende_CH
dc.publisherSpringerde_CH
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Business Economicsde_CH
dc.rightsLicence according to publishing contractde_CH
dc.subject.ddc330: Wirtschaftde_CH
dc.titleThe effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluationde_CH
dc.typeBeitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftde_CH
dcterms.typeTextde_CH
zhaw.departementSchool of Management and Lawde_CH
zhaw.organisationalunitWinterthurer Institut für Gesundheitsökonomie (WIG)de_CH
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0de_CH
zhaw.funding.euNode_CH
zhaw.issue3de_CH
zhaw.originated.zhawNode_CH
zhaw.pages.end233de_CH
zhaw.pages.start213de_CH
zhaw.publication.statuspublishedVersionde_CH
zhaw.volume83de_CH
zhaw.publication.reviewPeer review (Publikation)de_CH
zhaw.author.additionalNode_CH
Appears in collections:Publikationen School of Management and Law

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Drevs, F., & Tscheulin, D. K. (2013). The effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluation. Journal of Business Economics, 83(3), 213–233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0
Drevs, F. and Tscheulin, D.K. (2013) ‘The effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluation’, Journal of Business Economics, 83(3), pp. 213–233. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0.
F. Drevs and D. K. Tscheulin, “The effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluation,” Journal of Business Economics, vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 213–233, 2013, doi: 10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0.
DREVS, Florian und Dieter K. TSCHEULIN, 2013. The effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluation. Journal of Business Economics. 2013. Bd. 83, Nr. 3, S. 213–233. DOI 10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0
Drevs, Florian, and Dieter K. Tscheulin. 2013. “The Effect of Framing on the Choice of Co-Payment Policies, Reducing Moral Hazard and Post-Choice-Evaluation.” Journal of Business Economics 83 (3): 213–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0.
Drevs, Florian, and Dieter K. Tscheulin. “The Effect of Framing on the Choice of Co-Payment Policies, Reducing Moral Hazard and Post-Choice-Evaluation.” Journal of Business Economics, vol. 83, no. 3, 2013, pp. 213–33, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-012-0646-0.


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